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. Robinson LADB news analyst According to Frank LaRue, the end of the Cold War, changes in the
international political environment and the world economy, and strategic realignments between the
US and Latin America and within Guatemalan society are opening up a "completely new period in
Guatemala." A Guatemalan attorney specialized in labor law, LaRue is a prominent international
spokesperson for the popular opposition in Guatemala, and a leading human rights activist. He also
serves as the US-based representative of the United Representation of the Guatemalan Opposition
(RUOG), an umbrella group of exiled human rights, labor, social and political opposition groups.
In the following interview, LaRue discusses the abovementioned strategic realignments in the
context of the newly installed government of President Jorge Serrano, and prospects for the nation's
future. LADB: How do you characterize the current situation in Guatemala and prospects under
the new government? LaRue: Guatemala is at a very important juncture for two reasons. First, the
new administration, the Serrano government, is assuming power from a position of weakness, both
in terms of legitimacy, and regarding the economic and political situations. Second, we perceive a
fundamental change in US policy toward [Central America], and particularly, Guatemala. There
are already indications of serious confrontation between the Guatemalan army and the State
Department. Given these two variables, we believe a completely new period is opening up in
Guatemala. LADB: Can you provide more detail on these perceived changes in US policy? LaRue:
With the end of the Cold War, the United States has stopped seeing Latin America, and particularly
Central America, as a national security problem. The US has placed the Central American countries
in their real dimension and they are hardly a threat. This allows the US to better understand the
internal dynamics which have given root to the conflicts in each country rather than using the EastWest conflict as the focal point for these countries. Secondly, the United States is facing a new
crisis of economic confrontation and the struggle for markets with Japan and Western Europe. For
this reason, [Washington] is seeking to consolidate regional markets in Latin America. From this
perspective, we understand [the rationale for] the Argentina- Brazil [free trade] agreement, and the
resumption of Central American integration, which in turn is tied to bilateral agreements with the
United States, such as those negotiated with Canada and Mexico. This phenomenon has led the
US to seek a transition toward a more stable political situation, which...implies the demilitarization
of Latin America. If in the past the United States promoted the region's armies and militarization
in order to exercise control, from its perspective of national security, now the situation seems to
be reversed. It appears that the US is interested in promoting demilitarization and `controlled
conservative democracies'...in order to effectively promote conditions for economic growth and
avoid the traditional problems of political instability [the US] has encountered. In no way does
this mean that Latin American military forces are forsaking the political role they have played or
their removal from politics because neither the United States, nor the armed forces themselves,
have considered such a scenario. Rather, I think what is being taken away from [regional armed
forces] is their hegemonic role. They will continue to be essential political actors, but now they
will not exercise hegemony within the political apparatus as they formerly did. Indicators of this
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tendency are the departure of [Paraguayan Gen. Alfredo] Stroessner and [Chilean Gen. Augusto]
Pinochet from power, the repudiation of the military coup in Haiti against [current President]
Aristides, etc. In the concrete case of Guatemala, we have the tradition of an army that imposes itself
politically through naked force, through brutality, through state terror. But such a situation now
contravenes the US schema because it incites opposition, revolutionary fervor, confrontation and
crisis. [Military hegemony in this instance] means the lack of investment, enormous capital flight,
and the impossibility of moving beyond an agro-export stage of economic development. This is why
all the [economic] projects implemented by the outgoing Christian Democrat government were
supported by the US Agency for International Development (AID), such as export diversification,
and the introduction of new industries. But these schemes for economic transformation are only
possible to the extent that Guatemala becomes stabilized. And ironically, the vast majority both
outside and inside Guatemala now see the army as a factor of destabilization. LADB: What are the
concrete signs of an emerging confrontation between the US and the Guatemalan army? LaRue:
It is not mere coincidence that US Ambassador Thomas Stroock has begun to raise the issue of
human rights. Some said that the ambassador was merely acting on his own, but it seems clear
to me that he has been following instructions laid out by the State Department. Stroock has been
intensifying the tone of his criticism of human rights violations, and with regard to the case of the
US citizen, Michael DeVine who was tortured and murdered in El Peten province , he even insisted
that the commander of the local military base be removed. We need to see Stroock's increasingly
strong criticisms in context. In the midst of the electoral campaign the army continued and escalated
its atrocities, such as the massacre in Santiago, Atitlan. [Such actions] throw the whole process
off course. The US would like to see in Guatemala, in all of Latin America, normal transitions,
peaceful elections, etc. In fact, it was no coincidence that the US suspended military aid right before
Christmas [shortly after the Atitlan massacre]. Although the effect of this suspension of military
aid is questionable, since we are only talking about $2.8 million, it was a clear political message.
LADB: Some observers say there is an emerging division between the traditional Guatemalan
oligarchy and a "modernizing" sector, and that certain military factions support different elite
political factions. LaRue: In the context of this new crisis, US interest in creating a new economic
development model finds an echo among certain private sector interests and merchant groups tied
to tourism. There is much interest in stopping the war and in creating some type of democratic
model in Guatemala that brings peace and allows for stability. Some speak of the regionalization
of the economy, and, domestically, of stabilizing certain productive sectors and introducing nontraditional export products. Many people have drawn up projects and plans, but they are coming
to realize that the major obstacle to these plans and projects is the war and militarization. Thus we
see private sector groups denouncing the army not very strongly, of course, for the run the risk of
repression , but they are adopting a position in this regard. This situation has also broken up what
was once the great unified private sector bloc, CACIF [Coordinating Committee of Agricultural,
Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations]. CACIF is still THE representative of the private
sector, but it is no longer the mighty [monolithic] CACIF of the past. In the previous situation, there
was a lineal sequence of interests between U.S. policy, the role of the army, the interests of the
oligarchy and the private sector in general, and therefore, the government. This lineal sequence has
ruptured because U.S. interests have been modified. Those interests are no longer so easy to define,
and they don't necessarily coincide with the role played up to now by the army. Moreover, within
the private sector there has been a break with the past...There are oligarchic sectors committed
to maintaining the status quo, and who are aligned with the army. There is also an increasing
number of private businesspersons that are putting forth a different programme. They are saying,
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`Let's negotiate a peace dialogue among the political forces in conflict so that we can put an end
to the war and move on to a new stage.' Finally, there is the government. It is no longer so easy,
given this complex panorama, to define the government. It is not so easy for Serrano to simply
insert his administration into this panorama. The Serrano government will oscillate between
different [political] forces which will be pulling it in different directions. In this sense, the Serrano
government comes to power crippled or very weak, because it does not have a defined project
[political and economic programme]. As I suggested previously, the government responds in part
to the US project, in part to the army, etc. Therefore, much will depend on which sector it will align
with more closely. Personally, I had thought [Serrano] would line up more closely with the United
States, and on the basis of such an alignment, negotiate from a position of greater strength with the
army. However, based on his first actions in office, it would seem that Serrano is aligning himself
with the army. Maybe this is the sad reality of Guatemala: when governments assume office in a
country which is not democratic, they see their survival determined by accommodation with the
army. This is precisely the mistake that [outgoing president Vinicio] Cerezo committed. Meanwhile,
it would seem that there also certain divisions within the army, but these are difficult to distinguish.
Here is a curious example: in accordance with normal succession arrangements, former chief of
the high command Gen. Roberto Mata was slated to become the new defense minister. Mata is
close to Serrano, and Serrano chose him as Minister of Defense. However, the military vetoed
this appointment...because Mata is close to the United States. Given the current tensions between
the US and the army, Mata was unacceptable. The case is complicated, but it indicates that there
are divisions within the army, and that Serrano could not appoint the man he wanted. Moreover,
there are rumors that a certain of officers are talking about supporting the dialogue process [with
the guerrillas]. Why? Because they are concerned over the costs of the war and because they are
seeing the economic dimensions of a war situation. However, this sector is very much a minority.
LADB: Can you provide more detail on Serrano's weaknesses? LaRue: First, he is taking office at a
time when the government's image has been politically eroded not his, but [civilian] government
in general. As the first transition from military rule in many years, Cerezo had created enormous
expectations that were not fulfilled. For the Guatemalan people it was a great disappointment to
find that the military regime continued to govern [under Cerezo], as if there were no change [to
civilian rule]. There is also disenchantment with corruption and administrative incompetence.
There is a lot of cynicism regarding the civilian administrative apparatus. At present, people don't
really believe that a civilian is going to do things any better than the military. Second, Serrano
takes office with a very narrow mandate. Abstention was some 56% in the second round of voting
[presidential runoff]. The abstention rate pertains only to the population of registered voters. Thus,
Serrano was elected by the smallest proportion of the electorate in Guatemalan history. He does
not really have any sort of popular mandate. Another factor contributing to his political weakness is
that he does not have a strong political party, nor a platform, nor an ideology to stand on. Serrano
is a man of the right and an evangelical fundamentalist. But his party, the MAS (Solidarity Action
Movement), is a tiny, recently formed organization whose cadre and electoral candidates were
Serrano's family members and friends. MAS is weak in Congress, where it only won 18 of 112
seats. He won the presidency, but his party really has no infrastructure or presence. In fact, at the
municipal level [MAS] won only about 20 or so townships out of 380 in the country. LADB: So
rather than representing a specific sector within the political landscape, such as the "modernizing"
faction, Serrano is in fact undefined? LaRue: No. I think he is in the process of definition. In fact,
it was not Serrano but rather [Alvaro] Arzu [former mayor of Guatemala City, who came in third
in the presidential race] who represented the core of CACIF. Serrano won the support of CACIF
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only at the end of the campaign, when it became apparent that he would win, and because in
the end Serrano represents the neo-liberal perspective they are interested in. Therefore, at this
point, Serrano, does represent the business sector, but it is not the sector from which he sprung.
Moreover, he does not have a defined platform. Serrano's cabinet is an alliance of political forces
from his own party, the PAN [Arzu's party], people from the Democratic Socialist Party (PSD),
and the so-called independent technocrats. His economic cabinet is relatively moderate, drawn
in large part from the moderate technocrats. This reflects Serrano's pragmatism. He realizes that
the economic crisis requires a moderate approach; he is not going to implement a shock program
at this point. On the other hand, he has appointed Mario Solorzano of the PSD [as labor minister]
in an attempt to bring some control over workers. He is speaking of a social pact. Cerezo left the
country in bankruptcy and the United States has substantially reduced aid to all of Latin America,
including Guatemala. Serrano has no place to turn to for economic aid. He can only offer initiatives
of a political character, such as a social pact containing greater freedoms. For this reason we believe
Serrano will continue the national dialogue, because it is in that area where he can offer something
concrete. Economically, he has little to offer, but politically he can move. LADB: What are the
prospects for dialogue between the guerrillas and the government, for a continuation of the "Oslo
Process"? LaRue: I believe prospects are good. First, because there is growing consensus that it is
the army, along with its counterinsurgency schemes, which is holding the country back. More and
more people support the demand for demilitarization of the country. Second, people are coming
to understand that this war can go on for another hundred years without either side winning,
and nobody wants such a situation. This leads the more intelligent people, the more modernizing
sectors, to search for the alternative of peace, economic development and the consolidation of
democracy. Before, even to talk of democracy was seen as a threat to the security of the state, i.e.,
challenging the privileges of the oligarchy and the army. But now I believe there are those willing to
make concessions, who understand that Guatemala has to be a little more democratic, a little more
humanitarian. These people within the private sector are increasing their influence. And of course
there are the popular sectors, who have always been in favor of dialogue. Also, there are external
pressures interested in limiting the role of the army. These external pressures can nudge the army
into accepting negotiations. LADB: At what point is the dialogue in concrete terms? Would the next
scheduled meeting this one between the government and the guerrillas take up the issue of electing
a constituent assembly, and of institutional reform? LaRue: Yes, those issues will be addressed. But
that is only the mechanical aspect. The more fundamental issue here is the transition to democracy.
This is the core issue, in which it is necessary to enact different changes. For example, before
convening a constituent assembly to negotiate things, the government needs to make some serious
decisions, such as the restoration of human rights which are not negotiable. Right now we have to
demand that Serrano put an immediate end to the repression and the violation of human rights, as a
minimal indicator of transition to democracy. And on the heels of this, there must be other changes,
such as the dissolution of institutions that are unconstitutional, including the SIPROCI [Citizen
Protection System], which unifies all security forces around the army, and other illegal, paramilitary
organizations. Clandestine torture chambers must be dismantled. Freedom of association needs to
be guaranteed. Within the context of these changes we can then speak of a constitutional reform
process. Constitutional reform is important but it would be wrong to see it as the barometer, the
yardstick, of the negotiations and democratization process. Rather, such reform would be effect
of said process; it would grow out of society moving toward more democratic conditions, in which
the society would naturally adapt its legal scheme to greater democracy. Otherwise, it would
be easy to simply convene a constitutional assembly, draw up some amendments, and say `the
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problem has been resolved,' without anything really changing. LADB: Guatemala has seemingly
always been characterized by gross human rights violations, but a recent escalation in abuses has
occurred. What has caused the escalation? LaRue: The escalation is the result of two factors. First
is the power vacuum throughout the last two years of the Cerezo government. Cerezo did not have
much power and the crisis was growing, tied up with Cerezo's incompetence, the abortive coup
d'etats, [former defense minister Hector] Gramajo's departure, etc. There was sharp internal conflict
and a vacuum of authority which has been propitious for greater instability and abuses. The other
factor is the growth of the revolutionary movement, which provokes greater army repression of the
population. LADB: In addition to political democracy and the restoration of human rights, it has
been pointed out that Guatemala shows some of the most severe social and economic inequalities in
this hemisphere and that these inequalities are the root cause of the national conflict. Can there be
any movement toward addressing these inequalities? LaRue: This is Guatemala's great challenge.
Some people say that it is necessary to bring about political democracy in the context of a system of
economic democracy. I don't know how scientific the term is, but I believe the concept is valid. The
idea is to create a new society, where on the one hand a "safety net" is established that protects the
poorest sectors, because without doubt the level of poverty in Guatemala is troublesome. And on
the other hand, the entire population must have opportunities within the framework of growth. This
new economic reality would allow the fruits of development to be enjoyed by all. However, there
is also the fact that it is difficult to speak of such economic opportunities in small, poor countries
in which economic realities are changing. It is difficult to arbitrarily sidestep the policies of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank...[T]he clearest case of this problem is Nicaragua.
What one can do with a new [democratic] political system is define priorities and delineate which
sectors of the population you are going to provide protection for. But one cannot really attempt at
this point to undertake radical reform in Guatemala which would divide up productive units, or
reforms that would lead to dismantlement or dismembering certain productive sectors. No matter
how just it would be from the ethical point of view, it is just not viable from an economic point of
view. [See also preceding parts of series, appearing in 02/22/91, 02/27/91, and 03/06/91 issues of
CAU, respectively.]

-- End --
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